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Introduction: sUAS Interference in the NAS
Introduction: sUAS Interference in the NAS
What is AeroScope
Purpose
• Identify sUAS operator behaviors
• Preferred Types of sUAS (DJI)
• Date/time
• Altitude
• Location
• Evaluate potential aviation interference & safety 
hazards posed by sUAS
• sUAS operating distance from aerodromes
• Impact to local airport traffic patterns, approaches / 
departures, local airspace
• Historical near midair collision (NMAC)/encounter 
analysis (DAB only)
• Determine effectiveness of geofencing
Method
• Applied, exploratory research methodology
• Detection sampling using DJI AeroScope 
• RF collection device that detects sUAS manufactured by DJI
• ~10 SM detection range
• Data Collection (Convenient Sampling)
• Tampa, FL (TPA), Class B, 19-day sampling 
• Daytona Beach, FL (DAB), Class C, 13-day sampling
• Analysis Tools & Reference Sources
• Google Earth Pro (Data plotting)
• EasyMapMaker (KML conversions)
• AirNav (Heliport information)
• FAA Raster Charts (Aeronautical information & overlays)
• Google Maps (Location identification)
• Symphony OpsVue (Historical aircraft tracking integrating 
ADS-B/Mode C, & Mode S data)
• FAA UAS Facility Maps (UASFM)(Risk Analysis)
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Significant Findings (TPA)
• Several sUAS breaches into Class B 
surface area & surrounding shelf
• Geofencing areas sometimes offset from 
aeronautical hazard (heliports) 
• Visual approach to Peter O. Knight (TPF), 
Runway 18 reveals sUAS collision hazard
Risk Analysis Using FAA UAS Facility Maps (DAB)
• FAA established UAS Facility Maps as risk management tool 
for automated sUAS flight authorization via Low Altitude 
Authorization & Notification Capability (LAANC)
• LAANC not active in DAB area during data collection 
• LAANC UASFM segments / altitudes used for risk analysis only
• 93% of sUAS flights detected within UASFM segments
• 21.5% of sUAS flights exceeded maximum UASFM 
designated altitudes 
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Historical NMAC/Encounter Analysis (DAB)
• Coastline (likely banner towing)
• A/C#1 at 650’ MSL @ 0.30 NM 
• A/C#2 at 475’ MSL @ ~0.50 NM
• sUAS at 462’ MSL
• DAB Runway 7L 
• A/C#1 detected at touchdown point (30’ MSL)
• sUAS at 90’ MSL 0.25 NM left of approach path
• ILS RWY 7L Threshold Crossing Height is 88’ MSL
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Geofencing Effectiveness
Recommendations
• Integrate geofencing design with LAANC 
• Impose geofencing restrictions on UASFM segments
• Encode LAANC authorizations with a geofencing
unlock code to access UASFM segments
• Create Pilot sUAS situational awareness tools
• Leverage ADS-B Flight Information Service-Broadcast 
(FIS-B) and Aeronautical Exchange Model (AIXM) to 
provide pilots with awareness of active LAANC UAS 
Facility Map segments
• Codify operational restrictions within 14 CFR
• Model Aircraft operators are required to operate in 
accordance with the safety guidelines and within the 
programming of a “nationwide community-based 
organization (CBO)”
• Integrate operational CBO restrictions (such as those 
recommended by AMA) into 14 CFR 101
• Establishes permanent operational rules & enables 
better enforcement for non-compliant operators
Questions?
John M. Robbins
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